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ABSTRACT
In industrial control systems, devices such as Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) are commonly used to directly in-
teract with sensors and actuators, and perform local auto-
matic control. PLCs run software on two different layers:
a) firmware (i.e. the OS) and b) control logic (processing
sensor readings to determine control actions).
In this work, we discuss ladder logic bombs, i.e. malware
written in ladder logic (or one of the other IEC 61131-3-
compatible languages). Such malware would be inserted by
an attacker into existing control logic on a PLC, and either
persistently change the behavior, or wait for specific trigger
signals to activate malicious behaviour. For example, the
LLB could replace legitimate sensor readings with manipu-
lated values. We see the concept of LLBs as a generalization
of attacks such as the Stuxnet attack. We introduce LLBs
on an abstract level, and then demonstrate several designs
based on real PLC devices in our lab. In particular, we also
focus on stealthy LLBs, i.e. LLBs that are hard to detect by
human operators manually validating the program running
in PLCs.
In addition to introducing vulnerabilities on the logic layer,
we also discuss countermeasures and we propose two detec-
tion techniques.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are computer systems
that typically control physical processes that relate to power,
water, gas, manufacturing and other critical infrastructure.
ICS and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems rely on local programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
to interface with sensors and actuators. While PLC devices
are available from a range of manufacturers, they are all
commonly programmed with the same set of programming
languages based on IEC 61131-3. In particular, the IEC
61131-3 standard [10] contains ladder logic, functional block
diagram, and sequential text as different languages that are
used together to define logic to run on the PLCs. The logic
is then interpreted by the firmware running on the PLCs.
Modern PLCs provide security mechanisms to allow only
legitimate (e.g., signed) firmware to be uploaded. In con-
trast, logic running on the PLCs can typically be altered
by anyone with network or local USB access to the PLC.
This setting is the main difference to malware scenarios in
traditional corporate IT environments, where the injection
of attacker code is usually significantly harder.
Recently, the security of Cyber Physical Systems (CPS)
and related systems has gained a lot of attention [6, 16, 24–
26]. In particular, CPS such as critical infrastructure includ-
ing power grids, nuclear power plants, and chemical plants
are threatened. In CPS, physical-layer interactions between
components have to be considered as potential attack vec-
tors, in addition to the conventional network-based attacks.
In this work, we introduce ladder logic bombs (LLBs), i.e.
malware written in ladder logic (or one of the other IEC
61131-3-compatible languages). LLBs consist of logic that
is intended to disrupt the normal operations of a PLC by
either persistently changing the behaviour, or by waiting for
specific trigger signals to activate malicious behaviour. In
particular, the LLBs could lay dormant and hence hidden for
a very long time until a specific trigger is observed. Once
activated, the LLB could replace legitimate sensor readings
that are being reported by the PLC to the SCADA system
with manipulated values. We introduce LLBs by classifying
their purpose and action, and demonstrate several construc-
tions based on real PLC devices in our lab.
We implemented and tested our attacks on a real-world
ICS (the SWaTtestbed, see Section 4). In particular, we fo-
cused on stealthy LLBs, i.e. LLBs that are hard to detect by
human operators manually validating the program running
in PLCs. We provide a classification of logic based attacks,
such as the ones performed by Stuxnet [7].
We summarize our contributions as following:
• We analyzed firmware updates on the target platform
to detect vulnerabilities.
• We identify the issue of logic manipulations on PLCs,
and introduce the concept of ladder logic bombs (LLBs).
• We present a range of LLB prototypes, in particular
ones that attempt to hide from manual logic code in-
spection.
• We discuss countermeasures based on manual and au-
tomatic code inspection, and a central-server based so-
lution.
The structure of this work is as follows: In Section 2, we
introduce CPS systems, PLCs, and IEC 61131-3 in general.
We propose our Ladder Logic Bomb concept in Section 3,
and present example implementations in Section 4. The
results of a small-scale evaluation are summarized in Sec-
tion 5. We propose a countermeasure against LLB attacks
in Section 6. Related work is summarized in Section 7. We
conclude the paper in Section 8.
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Figure 1: Example local network topology of a plant
control network.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will introduce some of the salient prop-
erties of industrial control system (ICS) networks that we
have found so far. In addition, we will briefly introduce Lad-
der Logic programming language and the tools necessary to
interact with such PLCs.
2.1 ICS
In the context of this work, we consider ICS that are used
to supervise and control system like public infrastructure
(water, power), manufacturing lines, or public transporta-
tion systems. In particular, we assume the system consists
of programmable logic controllers, sensors, actuators, and
supervisory components such as human-machine interfaces
and servers. We focus on single-site systems with local con-
nections, long distance connections would in addition require
components such as remote terminal units (see below). All
these components are connected through a common network
topology.
Programmable logic controllers. PLCs are directly con-
trolling parts of the system by aggregating sensor readings,
and following their control logic to produce commands for
connected actuators.
Sensors and actuators. Those components interact with
the physical layer, and are directly connected to the Eth-
ernet network (or indirectly via remote input/output units
(IOs) or PLCs).
Network Devices. ICS often use gateway devices to trans-
late between different industrial protocols (e. g. Modbus/TCP
and Modbus/RTU) or communication media. In the case
where these gateways connect to a WAN, they are usually
called remote terminal units (RTUs).
2.2 Ladder Logic and Studio 5000
A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is an industrial
computer system that continuously monitors the state of in-
put devices and makes decisions based on a custom program
to control the state of output devices. PLCs are widely used
in industrial control systems (ICS) for handling sensors and
actuators, mainly because of their robust nature and ability
to withstand harsh conditions including severe heat, cold,
dust, and extreme moisture. Considering their widespread
Figure 2: Example ladder logic code with three
rungs
usage and important nature of tasks handled by PLCs, their
security against malicious manipulation is critical.
PLCs are user programmable devices. PLC programs are
typically written in a special application on a local host (per-
sonal computer), and then downloaded by either a direct-
connection cable or over a network to the PLC. The program
is stored in the PLC in a non-volatile flash memory. While
details differ for platforms from alternative vendors, it might
be required to enable remote change of control software on
the PLC through a physical switch (i.e., program mode on
ControlLogix devices). We observe that due to convenience,
in practical systems PLCs are often kept in that setting to
allow easy remote access. In addition, any attacker with
physical access is able to change the switch setting easily.
For that reason, we assume that remote or local reprogram-
ming access is possible in the remainder of this work.
IEC 61131-3 is an open international standard [10] for
PLCs that defines 2 Graphical and 1 Textual programming
language standards for PLCs:
• Ladder Logic Diagrams(graphical)
• Functional block Diagram (graphical)
• Structured Text (textual)
The most popular of those languages is Ladder Logic Di-
agrams. The main intuition behind this Ladder Logic Di-
agrams is to provide a system-wiring diagram abstraction
similar to electro-mechanical relays. Ladder logic is more
of a rule-based graphical language implemented by rungs,
rather than traditional procedural-based language. A rung
in the ladder represents a rule. They are called “ladder” di-
agrams because they resemble a ladder, with two vertical
rails (supply power) and as many ”rungs” (horizontal lines)
as there are control circuits to represent. Figure 2 depicts an
example logic implemented in ladder logic diagram. It con-
tains three rungs which utilize various inputs, outputs and
instruction blocks (If Equal To block here) to implement
certain logic.
”Studio 5000” is a software product of Rockwell Automa-
tion that provides an environment to develop a range of ele-
ments for a control system, for operational and maintenance
use. Its major element is the Studio 5000 Logix Designer
application, formerly (RSLogix 5000), software to program
Logix5000 controllers.
Another tool called RSLinx is used to establish USB-based
communication between PLCs and a host PC running Stu-
dio 5000. RSLinx is a Windows based software package to
interface with a range of ICS and automation hardware.
In this paper, we used Allan-Bradley PLCs (ControlLogix
5571) with Studio 5000 v21.00. It is important to note that
for different PLCs, different versions of RSLinx and Studio
5000 have to be used.
2.3 Analysis of PLC Vulnerabilities
As part of our investigations for this work, we carried
out an analysis to explore vulnerabilities in the firmware
running on PLCs such as the ControlLogix 5571. We briefly
summarize our results here.
We investigated whether a local attacker with physical
access to the PLC (or remote access via network) would be
able to a) obtain the currently running firmware from the
PLC, and b) upload a modified version of the firmware. To
put this into perspective, the latter technique could be used
to install hidden backdoors/trojans in the firmware, and/or
to change other operational behavior of the firmware. We
found that using a local USB connection, we were always
able to obtain the running firmware. In addition, it was pos-
sible to obtain the firmware via the network, if the PLC was
set into programming mode via a hardware selector switch.
In the following, we discuss the second action, the upload of
modified firmware.
The firmware for our PLC devices is distributed as a .dmk
file. This file contains two sets of binary files (.bin) and
associated digital certificates (.der). It also contains a .nvs
file which includes information about the firmware version,
product code/type, etc. It is this file which acts as a header
file for all the other files, linking each binary image with its
respective certificate and also mentions the load address for
every file.
The digital certificate is signed by the manufacturer (Rock-
well Automation). This digital signature is the hash value
of the certificate itself, encrypted with RSA algorithm using
the private key of the manufacturer. In addition, the certifi-
cates also contain a cryptographic hashsum (using SHA-1)
of the firmware image in one of its data fields. At firmware
update time, the module (PLC) receives the certificate con-
taining the firmware’s hash value and the certificate’s digi-
tal signature. The module computes the hash value of the
certificate, decrypts the signature, and compares the hash
values. If these hash values match, then the certificate is
valid. If not, the update is rejected. After receiving the
entire firmware image, the module then computes the hash
value of the firmware and compares it with the value from
the certificate. If the values do not match, the firmware up-
date is rejected. Given this construction, any modifications
to the firmware image by the attacker will change the hash
sum, leading to a mis-match between the hash sum already
existing in the certificate. Any change of the hash sum in the
certificate will invalidate the signature by the manufacturer.
This process is explained in more detail in Figure 3
Given the described setup, we decided to check whether
the certificates were correctly validated by the PLC. We re-
moved the original certificate of a valid firmware, and re-
placed it with a certificate that was signed by our own (self-
signed) CA. We ensured that the spoofed certificate had
matching content in every custom data fields, to match the
valid firmware image and its hash value. Then, we used the
Figure 3: Firmware Signing and Authentication
Process [2]
Figure 4: Flashing faulty firmware (with modified
certificate)
resulting file (our own .der) to update the firmware on a
PLC. The update failed, and we received an error (Trans-
fer: Error #11001). The process can be found in Figure 4,
where it can be seen that the error is triggered when trying
to upload the custom certificate. As conclusion, we currently
assume that the firmware update mechanism is sufficiently
secured against manipulations by an attacker. As a next
step, we evaluated the PLC logic update process. We dis-
covered that there were absolutely no checks/verifications
performed to ensure that logic updates being pushed onto
the PLC are coming from authorized sources. In the fol-
lowing, we concentrate on such manipulations of the PLC
logic.
3. LADDER LOGIC BOMBS
In this section, we present our proposed concept of ladder
logic bombs. In particular, we noticed that while changes
to the firmware of PLCs are made more difficult by digital
signatures, the actual logic that is executed on the PLCs
is not protected by such a measure. In addition, the lack
of security checks/authentication before downloading new
logic onto PLCs is a cause of major concern. An attacker
can exploit this by either gaining physical access to the PLCs
or over the network, and can download custom (malicious)
logic onto PLCs which can compromise the system. Next,
we discuss potential attack scenarios and goals, which can
be achieved through this vulnerability.
LLBActivation
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Figure 5: Ladder Logic Bomb (LLB) Classification
3.1 System and Attacker Model
In this work, we assume that the attacker is able to ac-
cess PLCs in an industrial control system either remotely
via the network, or physically. As we will show, commonly
such access will allow the attacker to read and modify the
programming logic of the PLCs without any authentication.
The attacker is assumed to have access to the respective soft-
ware required to download and upload logic configurations
to the PLC (e.g., Studio 5000 for ControlLogix PLCs).
The goals of the attacker can range from achieving a De-
nial of Service (DoS), to changing the behavior of the PLCs,
or to obtain data traces of sensor and control messages pro-
cessed by the PLC. In order to perform these attacks, the
attacker just needs access to the PLC system once, making
such attacks all the more dangerous. The attacker could also
have sporadic (physical) access to the PLC. For example, the
attacker only has access to the PLC once a week (because
he is a regular contractor). In these events, the attacker
can trigger any behavior changes (i.e trigger his ladder logic
bomb) at a point unrelated to his access time (e.g., to hide
correlations to his access).
The system we consider in this setting is very generic and
can be described as follows: a PLC in an industrial control
system which uses IEC 61131-3 languages for the logic, and
can be re-programmed as described above. It is connected
to sensors and actuators of a critical process. Operators
of the plant configured the logic of the PLC at design time.
Though they continuously monitor the status of these PLCs,
they seldom need to change the logic configuration of the al-
ready operational system. They are also able to manually
download the logic to inspect it, if required. Although we
will briefly discuss a network-based detection mechanism us-
ing an intrusion detection system later, such a solution will
not be able to detect changes by a local attacker. For that
reason, we do not focus on IDS in this work. In addition,
physical layer prevention mechanisms (camera, fences, etc)
are out of scope of this work.
We do not consider an attacker that is able to attack the
operator’s machines (as it was the case in Stuxnet), or able
to manipulate network traffic while it is being transmitted.
In particular, if the attacker was able to compromise the
operator’s machine, then the operator would not be able to
verify any code reliably. Such an attacker could be addressed
by using a trusted computing platform, which we consider
out of scope for this work. The attacker model does also
not consider insider attacks (e.g., an attacker who might
be regular contractor/employee with authorization to access
and modify the PLC logic).
3.2 Bomb Classification
Ladder logic bombs can be classified broadly by two crite-
ria (as shown in Figure 5). LLBs can be classified according
to their activation and triggering. They can either be ex-
ternally triggered by giving a certain input. Alternatively,
they can be triggered by internal logic (system states, spe-
cific instructions or data, clock, etc.)
LLBs can also be classified according to the alteration
they incur onto the existing PLC system. They can add
or remove certain functionality in the existing logic (mod-
ify function). These bombs can also alter the system values
such as system date/time, timezone, wall-clock time, or simi-
lar (modify system). Finally, these can also be used for data
exfiltration and transmitting crucial system data to a spy
node (transmit information).
Together, those classifications now describe more specific
LLBs. For example, a LLB that turns off a pump at 12 AM
would be classified as internally activated function modifi-
cation LLB.
3.3 Payload Types
In the following, we present a range of payload types, that
can be used to achieve the attacker’s goals as outlined in
Section 3.1. The payloads can be openly destructive (e.g.
causing a denial of service (DoS)), or enable stealthy at-
tacks (e.g., by establishing Man-in-the-Middle capabilities).
The MitM payload can be used to either eavesdrop on traf-
fic passing through the nodes, or potentially manipulate the
content of those messages undetected. By manipulating the
message content, the attacker can falsify sensor readings re-
ported to other PLCs and the SCADA system, or change
commands sent to actuators. In the following, we present
these attack goals in detail.
3.3.1 Denial of Service LLBs
A very basic (but destructive) payload performs a Denial
of Service (DoS) attack on the PLCs. By adding a malicious
piece of logic, hidden in the entire ladder logic of a certain
PLC, which is triggered at a specific instant can throw the
PLC off control and cause it to halt. This could damage
the process being controlled by the PLC and could poten-
tially cause a performance-threatening state in the system.
Such a bomb would continuously be looking for the trigger
condition, and as soon as it is met, it could launch into an
infinite-loop, repetitive subroutine calls, etc and render the
PLC useless.
3.3.2 LLBs to Manipulate Sensor Readings and Com-
mands
Another class of LLBs could be used to tamper actual
data being used/generated in the PLCs. The easiest targets
for such an attack are the sensor values being read from
the remote IOs (RIOs in Figure 1). These values could be
manipulated to cause the system to go into an unwanted
state. (Figure 6)
3.3.3 LLBs for Stealthy Data Logging
A third category of LLBs could be used to secretly track
and keep a log of sensitive PLC data. This can be achieved
through the use of FIFO buffers and recording data into
arrays on the PLCs. These kind of bombs are particu-
larly dangerous, as these do not disturb the working of the
system, making the host completely unaware of their pres-
ence. These can stay within the logic for extended periods
of time without detection, constantly leaking sensitive data
and commands.
3.4 Triggering
Here, we describe the different triggering mechanisms that
can be used with ladder logic bombs.
L1 Network
HMI
SCADA Historian
Remote IO
PLC1a PLC1b
PLCPLC
L0 Network
Sensor
42.42
Sensors
RIO
Process 1
Actuators
1a. Write '0' to 
      PLC valve tag
1b. Write '1' to 
      PLC valve tag
2. Write '1' to 
RIO valve tag
3. High current analog signal
Attacker
HMI
HMI
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Triggering at a particular Input.
The bomb could be set off when a pre-determined input is
detected. For example, we are targeting a water treatment
ICS for our experiments (see Section 4.1). The target PLC
is receiving inputs about the water level in one of the tanks
from its corresponding level sensor. The bomb could be set
off when a particular level is reached in the tank.
Triggering Sequence.
The bomb could also be triggered when a particular trig-
ger sequence is detected. This would potentially make the
bomb more difficult to detect, as none of its effects would
be visible until the particular sequence is detected as input.
This can be achieved by implementing a finite state machine
(FSM) using latches.
Timer.
The bomb could also be set off using a timer. This would
make the LLB like a real world time bomb, which sets into
motion when the timer has finished its count sequence. Us-
ing nested TON timers, it is possible to implement count
sequences which will last days.
Specific Internal Condition.
The bomb could be triggered when a particular internal
state is achieved. This particular triggering scheme requires
the attacker to have complete knowledge and understanding
of the logic on the PLCs. When a particular state variable,
for example a fault code, is set, the bomb could be set off
and the payload logic is executed.
3.5 Hiding LLBs in PLC Logic
The na¨ıve approach to detect any modifications in the
original logic (in our case, the LLBs) would be to download
the control logic from PLC devices, and manually inspect
them for code changes. In particular, engineers familiar with
the plant operations might be able to read through the code
and detect malicious changes. While that approach might be
feasible for small sites and very simple logic, we will show in
the following section that there are several options for the
attacker to hide the malicious payload within the logic to
make it harder to detect by such manual inspection.
Figure 7: Overview of SWaTTestbed.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe in detail the construction of
ladder logic bombs and demonstrate how they can be used
to disturb the functioning of ICS.
4.1 SWaT Testbed
The experiments were conducted on an industrial control
system testbed, called SWaT, located at the Singapore Uni-
versity of Technology and Design. Secure Water Treatment,
as depicted in Figure 7, is a fully functional (scaled down)
water treatment plant. SWaTwas constructed exclusively
as platform for research on cyber physical system security.
The water treatment process is partitioned into six stages,
starting with raw water in Tank 1 to filtered output water
in Tank 6. Each stage is controlled by an independent PLC
which determines control actions using data from sensors.
Sensors values and actuator commands are communicated
to and from a PLC via a plant network. The system also con-
tains monitors to view and ensure system states are within
acceptable operational boundaries. Data from sensors are
available for inspection on the Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and recorded by the His-
torian for subsequent analysis.
4.2 Attack 1: DoS using Add On Instructions
The Denial of Service (DoS) is a potential attack goal to
inflict (most often financial or reputation) damage on critical
systems. In a DoS attack, the attacker temporarily or per-
manently slows or stops correct operations of a system. On
the Internet, (distributed) DoS attacks are often achieved by
creating massive amounts of traffic that overload communi-
cation links or servers. As PLCs control the action of sensor
and actuators in the system, their operational availability
is often critical [15]. If the PLC is incapable of controlling
the actuators, it can have disastrous consequences (e.g., lead
to the loss of control of heavy machinery in an automobile
assembly plant).
Goal: In this setup, the goal was to launch a DoS attack
on one of the PLCs in a water treatment plant.
Construction: This has been achieved by implementing an
infinite loop as the bomb payload. The trigger mechanism
for this LLB is when a particular input is received. Similar
to Stuxnet [7], the trigger check condition lays on top of the
actual logic, which always stays on to check if the particular
input has been received. As soon as the desired trigger input
is received, the LLB springs into action.
Concealment: The actual malicious logic has been hidden
inside an Add-On Instruction. A new instruction has been
Figure 8: Malicious Add-On Instruction
created, which is very similar in its construction to the real
ADD block, with similar inputs: 2 sources A and B and
an output: Destination. It has also been named suitably
(ADD A) to disguise well with a real ADD block. From
the top overview of the ladder logic (which contains many
rungs), this looks just like any other ADD block on one of
the rungs. But inside this add-on instruction, the real bomb
(an infinite loop) is defined, and that adversely affects the
PLC operation. More details about this can be found in
Figure 8.
4.3 Attack 2: Manipulation of Sensor data us-
ing Subroutines
Another important function of the PLCs in ICS (in addi-
tion to controlling the actuators) is reading data from sen-
sors. That data can be critical information about the pro-
cess and system. Using the data, it is possible to derive the
current state of the process, which is used by the PLC to de-
termine appropriate control actions. Thus, tampering with
sensor data can cause systems to fail [14].
Goal: The goal for this attack was to manipulate sensor
readings coming from the remote IOs (RIOs in Figure 1) to
the PLC.
Construction: Since this is proof-of-concept, we decided
to manipulate the sensor values and increase them by a con-
stant offset (we arbitrarily chose four). As result, the LLB
payload is a simple ADD block which takes the real sensor
values and increases them by four, and stores them back into
the same tag. However, a more complex triggering mecha-
nism was used in this attack. In particular, the LLB is trig-
gered when a complete trigger sequence is detected. This
has been achieved by implementing a finite state machine
using latches (see Figure 9).
Concealment: For this attack, we also used A different
hiding technique. By inspecting the actual logic of the PLC
in the water treatment plant, we observed that the logic was
calling a large number of subroutines. We assume the sub-
routines were called that way to maintain good readability
of the ladder logic by the maintainers. However, that struc-
ture with large number of subroutines can be leveraged by
the attacker to hide the LLB. We tested this exploit by hid-
Figure 9: Inside the exploiting subroutine
Figure 10: Overview of the logic with the exploiting
subroutine
ing a trigger subroutine that gets executed every cycle of the
ladder logic (see Figure 10).
4.4 Attack 3: Data Logging using FFLs
The attacks discussed above are openly causing damage
or malfunctions, and their effects can be observed as soon as
triggered. However, there are another class of LLBs which
can be equally harmful but are harder to detect. In particu-
lar, such LLBs could be used for data logging and exporting
sensitive information about the system.
Goal: The goal of this attack is to achieve stealthy data
logging of sensitive information about the plant.
Construction: The data logging is achieved by using a
FIFO buffer which reads data into an array. The FFL block
has been used for this purpose. As shown in Figure 11, the
FFL block stores the tag PB LT Seq which contains sensi-
tive information about the count sequence used to determine
state of the plant. Those values are stored into the array2
and are converted into .csv format and stored on the SD
card in the PLC. Staying within our attacker model, an at-
tacker who has sporadic access (physical access to PLCs) to
the plant can come in, read these values stored on the SD
card. Then, insert this card back into the PLC and leave.
Figure 11: Data logging in a FIFO buffer
The trigger sequence for this could be a simple timer, thus
ensuring data logging after ’x’ days of plant operation.
Concealment: This LLB can again be concealed either
inside an Add-On instruction or as a subroutine. It can also
be left inside the main logic flow, since this LLB contains
just one extra rung, making its manual detection difficult in
large and complex code.
4.5 Attack 4: Trigger Major Faults on PLC
We now discuss another attack which is similar in effect
to the DoS attack.
Goal: The goal is to trigger major faults on the PLC which
causes its processor to halt and which cannot be fixed by a
hard reset.
Construction: Here we managed to cause two major faults
on the PLC.
1. Invalid Array Subscript
This was achieved by causing an overflow in the ar-
ray used for collecting tag information. This can be
done by creating a mismatch between the FIFO buffer
length and size of the array used to store values of the
buffer. Details can be found in Figure 12.
2. Stack Overflow
This was achieved by implementing a recursive sub-
routine call to itself. This caused the stack storing
the return pointer to overflow, halting the process and
crashing the PLC (Figure 13).
Concealment: These LLBs can be concealed within an Add-
On instruction or inside a subroutine.
4.6 Analysis of Attacks
Ideally, there would be a metric to measure the stealthi-
ness of LLBs, that would indicate how hard different LLBs
are to discover. So far, we have not found a good way to
measure that property. In the following, we instead use the
relative additional lines of code (RALOC) to measure the
stealthiness. In particular, the increase of lines of code in
the logic can also lead to increased memory consumption
at runtime. We observed that there are two types of mem-
ory that is used by a ladder logic program: I/O memory and
Data & Logic memory. As part of our analysis, we measured
Table 1: Comparison of Attacks Performed
Attack Increase in Memory(%)
Attack 1: DoS using AOI 2.60
Attack 2: Manipulate Sensor 3.84
Attack 3: Data Logging 3.41
Attack 4: Major Faults 4.09
the difference (increase) in memory of the original logic when
malicious ladder logic bombs were added. It was observed
that there was no increase in the I/O memory of the PLC at
all, which is primarily because no new inputs/outputs were
created to trigger or apply the ladder logic bombs discussed
above. The only increase observed was in the data and logic
memory, which is also marginal, as depicted in Table 1. One
important thing to note is that the size of Attack 3 (data log-
ging) will depend on the amount of data that is logged. As
result, the RALOC metric increases, and the modifications
might become more visible.
To mitigate that effect, it is best to save the data on the
SD card and then flush the arrays so that they can be re-used
if more data needs to be logged.
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Evaluation Context
To estimate the difficulty for humans to detect LLBs, we
ran a small-scale challenge as part of an event organized at
our institution. Six teams from academia and industry par-
ticipated in the event, and received three challenges related
to LLBs. We note that not all participants were very fa-
miliar with ladder logic programming, but each team was
provided a testbed manual to understand the overall setup,
software use, and tag initialization.
The challenges were run remotely with teams in different
locations around the world, connection to a virtual oper-
ator machine and a physical PLC in our lab. In particu-
lar, the virtual machine was configured with Studio 5000
and RSLinx to provide communication to the testbed PLC.
The participants connected to the virtual operator machine
through a virtual private network (VPN).
For all three challenges, the PLCs were programmed with
a basic configuration to interact with the IOs and send se-
lected control signals. We now summarize the challenges,
which involved a brief description of the problem statement,
along with specific goals to achieve.
Jump to catch the flag.
The first challenge goal was to detect an LLB that was
designed to read a connected sensor, manipulate that read-
ing, and then potentially forward that reading to the outside
world. To solve that challenge, the participants had to follow
the data flow coming from all sensors to the control func-
tions, and identify parts of the code that should not need
the sensor value, but used it nevertheless. After identifying
the LLB code, the participants could then read the created
tag value to obtain the flag.
Play with Add_on Instructions.
The second Challenge was to get the true value of a con-
nected analog sensor that was read by some logic. To solve
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the challenge, the participant had to detect an LLB that
tried to hide as an Add on instruction (see Figure 8). Once
the participant detected the LLB, they were able to remove
it to obtain the true value (or simply determine the applied
offset, and remove it manually).
Fix Me if you can.
The third challenge consisted of logic that contained a
programming error. When run on the PLC, the code would
lead to a “PLC Major Fault” error message, and stop exe-
cuting. In particular, we wrote the code to access a memory
array with an index that exceeded the length of the memory
array (similar to a buffer overflow). Such a fault could be
used as LLB payload to shut down operations of a PLC. To
solve that challenge, the participants had to understand the
FFL block and detect that an uninitialized memory access
can lead PLC to faulty state.
5.2 Challenges Results
This section summarized the challenge results as obtained
during the CTF event. The details of the teams are anonymized.
One of the team is not included in the analysis, as the
team managed to obtain the flag through an unrelated side-
channel. The other teams’ results are summarized in Ta-
ble 2. Only Team 2 was able to solve all the challenges (i.e.,
they were able to detect all the LLBs), and Team 5 was able
to solve one challenge. The remaining teams were not able
to detect any LLBs.
Table 2: LLB Evaluation details.
Teams First Bomb Second Bomb Third Bomb
Team 1    
Team 2 # # #
Team 3    
Team 4    
Team 5 #   
Legend #: Detected,  : Undetected.
Our (limited) evaluation shows that detecting malicious
code or hidden logic bombs in critical infrastructure con-
troller code is not a trivial task. Only two teams were able
to find the LLBs among a large number of subroutine calls
along with several message and instruction blocks. The
more advanced challenges which included the LLB hiding
as Add on instruction were only solved by one team. We
conclude that in order to detect LLBs, an operator must
have sound knowledge of Studio 5000 and programming lan-
guages like ladderlogic, Structure text, and functional block
diagram along with its syntactical and semantic meaning.
In practice, that can be challenging if an operator has to
inspect code with ill-specified functionality or written by a
subcontractor.
6. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we discuss potential countermeasures against
LLB attacks. In particular, we discuss a) network-based
countermeasures, and b) centralized validation of running
code.
In the following, we assume that the countermeasures are
retro-fitted into an existing industrial control system. In
particular, we assume it is not possible to change the PLCs
themselves. If we could change the way logic updates are
applied to PLCs, it would trivially be possible to introduce
user authentication (e.g. with username/password, or public
key-based), or cryptographic signatures for logic updates.
The PLC would then only accept the logic code update if
the user is successfully authenticated, or the authenticity of
the update has been validated.
The following two proposals do not require such changes
to the existing PLCs, and should thus be easier to imple-
ment in existing systems. In the following, we assume that
there are a number of well-known operators in the ICS, that
are allowed to update the control logic of the PLCs. Any at-
tempts to update PLC logic by other third parties is counted
as an attack. We assume that the default software is used to
apply logic updates (e.g., Studio 5000), and that we cannot
change the behaviour of that software (e.g., we cannot add
additional authentication information into traffic generated
by it).
We assume the attacker model from before: the attacker
has the capability to manipulate the logic running on a PLC
once, but does not have permanent access. The attacker did
not compromise the operator’s machine. The attacker is also
not able to manipulate third party network traffic.
6.1 Network-based countermeasures
If an intrusion detection system (IDS) is already used in
the network to monitor traffic for spreading malware or other
malicious traffic, then that IDS could potentially be used to
identify the specific traffic related to logic updates on PLCs
connected to the network. If unauthorized logic updates
over the network are observed, an alarm could be raised.
A similar IDS is proposed in [8], where the authors model
periodic communication between HMI and PLCs using a de-
terministic finite automata. The system flags anomalies if
a message appears out of position in normal (general) se-
quence of messages. If the IDS is configured to operate as
intrusion prevention system (IPS), the offending traffic could
even be dropped in real time.
The problem with this proposal is related to the identifi-
cation of authorized logic updates. As we cannot change the
traffic generated by the respective software, there is no way
to embed specific authentication information. Thus, we can
only use information such as IP source address (supposedly
related to the authorized person), which is not ideal (as it
can be spoofed).
6.2 Centralized Logic Store
Our second proposal is based on two components: a) a
centralized logic store (CLS) of the latest version of logic
running on all PLCs of the ICS, and b) a tool to periodically
download currently running logic from the PLCs, and to
validate that against the “golden” copy from the CLS. An
overview of our proposed system can be found in Figure 14.
Submission of golden samples.
All authorized engineers are required to submit the most
recent version of logic for each PLC to the CLS when they
change the logic running on the PLCs. To do so, they can
use a simple application that requires them to identify the
respective logic file, the target PLC, and their credentials.
That application will then use the credentials to establish an
authenticated secure channel to the CLS (e.g. using TLS),
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Figure 14: Centralized Logic Store based counter-
measure
and then upload the latest logic version to the CLS (e.g.
using HTTP over the established TLS session).
Periodic Logic Validation.
We have implemented a python-based tool to manually
and periodically validate the logic. The user first exports
ladder logic to a .L5K file (sequential text) on the local ma-
chine using Studio 5000. Next, our tool parses the .L5K file
and extracts a unique serial number corresponding to the
logic. Then, the tool connects to the CLS where the cor-
rect golden logic is searched by using Beautiful Soup parser
(BSP). BSP is a python library to parse HTML and XML
pages, in our case BSP parse CLS and look for all .L5K file
followed by our parser which looks for correct golden logic
by identifying the unique serial number.
Then, the tool performs a comparison between the logic
found on the PLC, and the golden sample. If differences
are found, they can be visualized to a human operator using
standard functionality provided by tools such as diff. The
algorithm below summarizes the whole process.
Algorithm 1 CLS based countermeasure
Require: Downloaded malicious PLC logic (.L5K) file
Establish server connection at specific port
Parse local .L5K file and fetch serial no.
GET golden sample from server with serial no.
if diff(local .L5K,golden reference .L5K) == 0 then
Local logic successfully validated
else
Local logic differs, present diff to user
User manually inspects code differences
if User detects attack then
Raise alarm
else if Local Logic newer then
Update golden sample on CLS if authorized
else
Update local logic with golden sample
end if
end if
There is a tool developed by Rockwell Automation called
Factory Talk AssetCentre, which tries to achieve similar
functionality in securing PLC devices. However it has many
additional dependencies, for example: need for a network
adapter card on both client/server side, FactoryTalk ser-
vices platform, RSLinx, RSLogix 5000, etc. The proposed
CLS based approach that we have described above is easy to
use, in contrast to Factory Talk AssetCenter which requires
a operator, having sound knowledge of system requirements
and capacity. The CLS based approach is much more com-
plete, dependency-free and general purpose to use across
platforms/PLCs from different vendors.
7. RELATED WORK
General Threats to ICS. It has been observed over the
years that process control systems are vulnerable to various
exploits with potentially damaging physical consequences [1,
4, 17,23].
In [22] Morris et al discuss different attacks such as mea-
surement injection, command injection, denial of service,
etc, on SCADA control systems which use the MODBUS
communication protocol. Much like the rest, this study is
again restricted to exploiting the network layer to attack
the PLCs. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze control logic
vulnerabilities, which can be manifested through malicious
logic additions.
The authors of the cited related generally highlight that
ICS/SCADA systems are threatened by attacks, despite wide-
spread use of air gaps between the Internet and ICS network.
Stuxnet. In 2010, Stuxnet [7] caused a radical shift in
focus for security of such control systems by demonstrating
practical exploitation of the control logic in these devices.
This resulted in increasing focus on security aspects of PLCs
and their control logic [3, 11,12].
In [11], Karnouskos et al. discuss Stuxnet and how it
managed to deviate the expected behaviour of PLC. In [12],
Kim et al. discuss the cyber security issues in nuclear power
plants and focused on stuxnet inherited malware attacks on
control system, and its impacts in future along with its coun-
termeasures.
Protocol-based attacks. The authors of [3] discuss replay,
reconnaissance and authentication by-pass attacks. These
attacks can be performed by sending probe requests or by
examining the ISO-TSAP conversation and authenticating
oneself by generating packets with same hash, in turn, achiev-
ing access to PLC logic. All these attacks are focused on
exploiting the communication protocols to gain access to
PLCs.
In [21], the authors investigate vulnerabilities of indus-
trial PLCs on firmware and network level, leaving out any
analysis on logic level exploits. In this work, we provide a
consolidated study on logic layer manipulations and provide
logic level safeguarding methods, unlike the network based
security (e.g., firewall, VPN security and secured layered
architecture) methods proposed in majority of the papers
above.
Control Logic Manipulation. In [18], the authors pro-
pose a PLC malware capable of dynamically generating a
payload based on observations of the process taken from in-
side the control system. The malware first gathers clues
about the nature of the process and the layout of physi-
cal plant. Dynamic payload is then generated to meet the
specific payload goal. However, the authors assume that
an attacker must be insider or have prior knowledge of the
targeted system. That dependency is worked upon in [19],
which proposes a tool to automatically determine seman-
tics of the target PLC, minimizing the need for prerequisite
knowledge of target control system. This work however does
not go into details of malicious logic construction on ladder
logic or any other IEC 61131-3-compatible language and fo-
cus mainly on network layer attack.
Countermeasures. In general, attempting to validate the
authenticity of the root file system or files/directories is not
a new concept. In [13], Kim et al. proposed a monitor-
ing tool ”Tripwire”. It monitors the Unix based file system
and notifies the system administrator in case a corrupted
file or alteration is detected. In contrast to Tripwire tool
(which uses interchangeable signature subroutines to iden-
tify changes in file) our proposed CLS based countermeasure
compares the local instance of a file with its authorized one.
Another important point to note here is that the Tripwire
tool is host based, used for unix based file systems whereas
proposed countermeasure is used in respect to PLC logic
file(.L5K) extracted from Studio 5000 tool.
We found a number of works focused on development
of countermeasure techniques to safeguard PLCs and other
components of industrial control systems. In [5], a sequence
aware intrusion detection system (S-IDS) is proposed. The
IDS focuses on detection certain sequences of events (e.g.
sensor readings or control actions) that are harmless on their
own, but can lead to unwanted consequences if chained to-
gether. In [9], the authors propose a detector which monitors
process variables continuously to ascertain changes and at-
tacks. Other attack detection methods for PLCs are found
in [27] and [20]. In [27], the authors propose an approach
based on symbolic execution of PLC code along with con-
trol model checking to automatically detect the malicious
code running on the PLC. In [20], a Trusted Safety Verifier
(TSV) is implemented on a Raspberry PI set-up, placed in
between the control system network and the PLC as a bump-
in-the-wire to intercepts all the controller code and validate
it against all the safety properties defined by process engi-
neer. This requires additional hardware set-up to function.
In this paper, we intend to propose countermeasures which
can be very easily used with the traditional (existing) indus-
trial control system architecture and have least dependency
on PLC internals (construction and interface internals).
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced the term ladder logic
bombs to discuss the problem of logic malware for PLCs,
such as modifications performed by Stuxnet [7]. Contem-
porary vulnerabilities study for such devices usually do not
include analysis on control logic level, which is an impor-
tant source of attacks as demonstrated in this work. We
analyzed vulnerabilities in the firmware running on PLCs
and depicted case studies and attack scenarios in real-time
on actual PLCs to inflict damage on industrial control sys-
tems. Through a small-scale evaluation, we have shown that
even simple LLBs can be hard to detect in real-world con-
trol logic code. All the tests were conducted on a real world
ICS, unlike majority of the theoretical works presented in
the literature so far. Finally, a centralized logic store based
countermeasure technique was proposed and implemented,
that can detect logic level based attacks effectively.
9. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Nicolas Iooss for his support and contributions
related to EtherNet/IP support in MiniCPS and the demon-
strated attacks, and Pierre Gaulon for his help on the phys-
ical layer simulation. This work was partially supported by
SUTD’s startup grant SRIS14081.
10. REFERENCES
[1] S. Amin, X. Litrico, S. S. Sastry, and A. M. Bayen.
Stealthy deception attacks on water SCADA systems.
In Proceedings of Conference on Hybrid systems:
Computation and Control, pages 161–170. ACM, 2010.
[2] B. Batke, J. Visoky, J. Kay, S. Mintz, and W. Cook.
Methods for firmware signature, 2013. US Patent
8,484,474.
[3] D. Beresford. Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs,
2011. Proceedings of Black Hat USA.
[4] A. A. Ca´rdenas, S. Amin, and S. Sastry. Research
challenges for the security of control systems. In
Proceedings of USENIX workshop on Hot Topics in
Security (HotSec), 2008.
[5] M. Caselli, E. Zambon, and F. Kargl. Sequence-aware
intrusion detection in industrial control systems. In
Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on
Cyber-Physical System Security, pages 13–24. ACM,
2015.
[6] R. Chabukswar, B. Sino´poli, G. Karsai, A. Giani,
H. Neema, and A. Davis. Simulation of network
attacks on SCADA systems. In Proceedings of
Workshop on Secure Control Systems, 2010.
[7] N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien. W32. stuxnet
dossier.
[8] N. Goldenberg and A. Wool. Accurate modeling of
modbus/tcp for intrusion detection in scada systems.
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure
Protection, 6(2):63–75, 2013.
[9] D. Hadzˇiosmanovic´, R. Sommer, E. Zambon, and
P. H. Hartel. Through the eye of the PLC: semantic
security monitoring for industrial processes. In
Proceedings of the Conference on Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), pages
126–135. ACM, 2014.
[10] K. H. John and M. Tiegelkamp. IEC 61131-3:
Programming Industrial Automation Systems Concepts
and Programming Languages, Requirements for
Programming Systems, Decision-Making Aids.
Springer, 2nd edition, 2010.
[11] S. Karnouskos. Stuxnet worm impact on industrial
cyber-physical system security. In Proceedings of
Conference on Industrial Electronics Society
(IECON), pages 4490–4494. IEEE, 2011.
[12] D.-Y. Kim. Cyber security issues imposed on nuclear
power plants. Annals of Nuclear Energy, 65:141–143,
2014.
[13] G. H. Kim and E. H. Spafford. The design and
implementation of tripwire: A file system integrity
checker. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 18–29.
ACM, 1994.
[14] O. Kosut, L. Jia, R. Thomas, and L. Tong. Malicious
data attacks on smart grid state estimation: Attack
strategies and countermeasures. In Proc. of the IEEE
Conference on Smart Grid Communications
(SmartGridComm), pages 220–225, Oct 2010.
[15] M. Krotofil, A. A. Ca´rdenas, B. Manning, and
J. Larsen. CPS: driving cyber-physical systems to
unsafe operating conditions by timing DoS attacks on
sensor signals. In Proceedings of the Conference on
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
(ACSAC), pages 146–155. ACM, 2014.
[16] J. Lin, W. Yu, X. Yang, G. Xu, and W. Zhao. On false
data injection attacks against distributed energy
routing in smart grid. In Proceedings of Conference on
Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS), 2012.
[17] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter. False data injection
attacks against state estimation in electric power
grids. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC), 14(1):13, 2011.
[18] S. McLaughlin. On dynamic malware payloads aimed
at programmable logic controllers. In Proceedings of
USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
(HotSec), pages 10–10, Aug 2013.
[19] S. McLaughlin and P. McDaniel. SABOT:
Specification-based payload generation for
programmable logic controllers. In Proc. of the ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS), pages 439–449. ACM, 2012.
[20] S. E. McLaughlin, S. A. Zonouz, D. J. Pohly, and
P. D. McDaniel. A trusted safety verifier for process
controller code. In Proc. Network and Distributed
System Security Symp. (NDSS), 2014.
[21] S. A. Milinkovic and L. R. Lazic. Industrial PLC
security issues. In Proceedings of Conference on
Telecommunications Forum (TELFOR), pages
1536–1539. IEEE, 2012.
[22] T. H. Morris and W. Gao. Industrial control system
cyber attacks. In Proceedings of the Symposium for
ICS and SCADA cyber security research (ICS-CSR).
BCS Learning and Development Ltd., 2013.
[23] J. Pollet. Electricity for free? The dirty underbelly of
SCADA and smart meters, 2010. Proceedings of Black
Hat USA.
[24] E. Wang, Y. Ye, X. Xu, S. Yiu, L. Hui, and K. Chow.
Security issues and challenges for cyber physical
system. In Proceedings of Conference on Cyber,
Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom), pages 733
–738, Dec. 2010.
[25] B. Zhu, A. Joseph, and S. Sastry. A taxonomy of
cyber attacks on SCADA systems. In Proceedings of
Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing
(CPSCom), pages 380–388, 2011.
[26] S. Zonouz, K. Rogers, R. Berthier, R. Bobba,
W. Sanders, and T. Overbye. SCPSE:
Security-oriented cyber-physical state estimation for
power grid critical infrastructures. Smart Grid, IEEE
Transactions on, 3(4):1790–1799, Dec 2012.
[27] S. Zonouz, J. Rrushi, and S. McLaughlin. Detecting
industrial control malware using automated PLC code
analytics. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 12(6):40–47,
2014.
